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Semantically Secure Lattice Codes
for the Gaussian Wiretap Channel
Cong Ling, Laura Luzzi, Jean-Claude Belfiore, and Damien Stehle´
Abstract—We propose a new scheme of wiretap lattice coding
that achieves semantic security and strong secrecy over the
Gaussian wiretap channel. The key tool in our security proof
is the flatness factor which characterizes the convergence of
the conditional output distributions corresponding to different
messages and leads to an upper bound on the information
leakage. We not only introduce the notion of secrecy-good lattices,
but also propose the flatness factor as a design criterion of
such lattices. Both the modulo-lattice Gaussian channel and the
genuine Gaussian channel are considered. In the latter case, we
propose a novel secrecy coding scheme based on the discrete
Gaussian distribution over a lattice, which achieves the secrecy
capacity to within a half nat under mild conditions. No a priori
distribution of the message is assumed, and no dither is used in
our proposed schemes.
Index Terms—lattice coding, information theoretic security,
strong secrecy, semantic security, wiretap channel.
I. INTRODUCTION
The idea of information-theoretic security stems from
Shannon’s notion of perfect secrecy. Perfect security can
be achieved by encoding an information message M (also
called plaintext message), belonging to a finite space M,
into a codeword or ciphertext Z, belonging to a discrete or
continuous space Z , in such a way that the mutual information
I(M;Z) = 0. However, perfect security is not so practical
because it requires a one-time pad.
In the context of noisy channels, Wyner [1] proved that
both robustness to transmission errors and a prescribed de-
gree of data confidentiality could simultaneously be attained
by channel coding without any secret key. Wyner replaced
Shannon’s perfect secrecy with the weak secrecy condition
limn→∞ 1n I(M;Z
n) = 0, namely the asymptotic rate of leaked
information between the message M and the channel output Zn
should vanish as the block length n tends to infinity.
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Unfortunately, it is still possible for a scheme satisfying
weak secrecy to exhibit some security flaws, e.g., the total
amount of leaked information may go to infinity, and now
it is widely accepted that a physical-layer security scheme
should be secure in the sense of Csisza´r’s strong secrecy
limn→∞ I(M;Zn) = 0 [2].
In the notion of strong secrecy, plaintext messages are often
assumed to be random and uniformly distributed in M. This
assumption is deemed problematic from the cryptographic
perspective, since in many setups plaintext messages are not
random. This issue can be resolved by using the standard no-
tion of semantic security [3] which requires that the probability
that the eavesdropper can guess any function of the message
given the ciphertext should not be significantly higher than
the probability of guessing it using a simulator that does not
have access to the ciphertext. The relation between strong
secrecy and semantic security was recently revealed in [4] for
discrete wiretap channels, namely, achieving strong secrecy
for all distributions of the plaintext messages is equivalent to
achieving semantic security.
Wiretap codes achieving strong secrecy over discrete mem-
oryless channels have been proposed in [5, 6]. In particular,
polar codes in [6] also achieve semantic security (this was
implicit in [6]), although reliability over the main channel is
not proven when it is noisy. For continuous channels such as
the Gaussian channel, the problem of achieving strong secrecy
has been little explored so far and the design of wiretap codes
has mostly focused on the maximization of the eavesdropper’s
error probability [7]. Recently, some progress has been made
in wiretap lattice codes over Gaussian wiretap channels. It is
quite natural to replace Wyner’s random binning with coset
coding induced by a lattice partition Λe ⊂ Λb. The secret
bits are used to select one coset of the coarse lattice Λe
and a random point inside this coset is transmitted. Wiretap
lattice codes from an error probability point of view were
proposed in [8], which also introduced the notion of secrecy
gain and showed that the eavesdropper’s error probability
limn→∞ Pe = 1 for even unimodular lattices. These lattice
codes were further investigated in [9]. In [10] the existence of
wiretap lattice codes (based on the ensemble of random lattice
codes) achieving the secrecy capacity under the weak secrecy
criterion was demonstrated. Finally, we note that the secrecy
capacity of the continuous mod-lattice channel with feedback
was studied in [11], and that standard lattices codes for
the Gaussian channel [12] were used to provide weak/strong
secrecy in the settings of cooperative jamming and interference
channels in [13–15].
2Main Contributions
In the present work, we propose wiretap lattice codes that
achieve strong secrecy and semantic security over (continuous)
Gaussian wiretap channels. Firstly, we extend the relation
between strong secrecy and semantic security [4] to continuous
wiretap channels. We further derive a bound on the mutual
information in terms of the variational distance for continuous
channels. More importantly, we propose the flatness factor of a
lattice as a fundamental criterion which guarantees L1 conver-
gence of conditional outputs and characterizes the amount of
information leakage. This leads to the definition of “secrecy-
good lattices”. Letting the coarse lattice Λe be secrecy-good,
we straightforwardly tackle the problem of secrecy coding for
the mod-Λ wiretap channel. We then extend the scheme to
the Gaussian wiretap scenario by employing lattice Gaussian
coding. More precisely, the distribution of each bin in our
wiretap code is a discrete Gaussian distribution over a coset of
a secrecy-good lattice. We use the flatness factor to show that
this scheme can approach the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian
wiretap channel up to a constant gap of 12 nat (under very mild
assumptions), by using minimum mean-square error (MMSE)
lattice decoding at the legitimate receiver.
The proposed approach enjoys a couple of salient features.
Firstly, throughout the paper, we do not make any assumption
on the distribution of the plaintext message M, i.e., the security
holds for any particular message. Thus, similarly to [4], the
proposed wiretap lattice codes can achieve semantic security.
Secondly, in contrast to [12], we do not use a dither. This may
simplify the implementation of the system.
Relations to Existing Works
Relation to secrecy gain: The secrecy gain [8] is based
on the error probability analysis, while the flatness factor
is directly related to the variational distance and mutual
information. Yet, despite the different criteria, they are both
determined by the theta series and are in fact consistent with
each other. Given the fundamental volume of a lattice, a small
flatness factor requires a small theta series, which coincides
with the criterion from [8] for enjoying a large secrecy gain.
Relation to resolvability: In [16, 17], a technique based on
resolvability was suggested to obtain strong secrecy, which
uses a binning scheme such that the bin rate is above the
capacity of the eavesdropper’s channel. We will show this is
also the case for the proposed lattice scheme.
Relation to lattice-based cryptography: Lattice-based
cryptography [18] aims at realizing classical cryptographic
primitives, such as digital signatures and public-key encryption
schemes, that are provably secure under algorithmic hardness
assumptions on worst-case lattice problems, such as variants
of the decisional shortest vector problem. In the present
work, we propose an encryption scheme without keys for
the Gaussian wiretap channel that involves lattices, but the
security is proven without algorithmic hardness assumptions.
Organization
Section II studies the relation between semantic security
and strong secrecy for continuous wiretap channels. In Section
III, we review lattice Gaussian distributions and propose the
flatness factor as a novel machinery. Sections IV and V
address the mod-Λ channel and the Gaussian wiretap channel,
respectively. In Section VI, we conclude the paper with a brief
discussion of open issues.
Throughout this paper, we use the natural logarithm, de-
noted by log, and information is measured in nats. We use
the standard asymptotic notation f (x) = O (g (x)) when
lim supx→∞ |f(x)/g(x)| < ∞, f (x) = Ω (g (x)) when
lim supx→∞ |g(x)/f(x)| < ∞, f (x) = o (g (x)) when
lim supx→∞ |f(x)/g(x)| = 0, and f (x) = ω (g (x)) when
lim supx→∞ |g(x)/f(x)| = 0 .
II. STRONG SECRECY AND SEMANTIC SECURITY IN
CONTINUOUS CHANNELS
In this section, we investigate the relation between strong
secrecy and semantic security in continuous wiretap channels.
A. Wiretap Codes
Consider an n-dimensional continuous memoryless wiretap
channel with input Xn and outputs Yn, Zn for the legitimate
receiver and the eavesdropper respectively.
Definition 1 (Wiretap code [19, 20]). An (R,R′, n) wiretap
code is given by a message set Mn = {1, . . . , enR}, an
auxiliary discrete random source S of entropy rate R′ taking
values in Sn, an encoding function fn :Mn×Sn → Rn and a
decoding function gn : Rn →Mn for the legitimate receiver.
Let Xn = fn(M, S) be the channel input for a distribution M
of messages, and Mˆ = gn(Yn) the estimate of the legitimate
receiver.
There are two options to define the transmission power:
• Average power constraint: Channel input Xn satisfy the
constraint
1
n
E
[
‖Xn‖2
]
≤ P (1)
with respect to M chosen as the uniform distribution and
to the randomness source S.
• Individual power constraint: One can impose a more
stringent power constraint on each individual bin (without
assuming M is uniformly distributed):
∀m ∈Mn, 1
n
ES
[
‖fn(m, S)‖2
]
≤ P. (2)
Incidentally, the proposed lattice codes will satisfy the
individual power constraint.
B. Strong Secrecy and Semantic Security
The Kullback-Leibler divergence of the distributions pX
and pY is defined as D(pX‖pY) =
∫
Rn
pX(x) log
pX(x)
pY(x)
dx. The
mutual information between X,Y is defined by
I(X;Y) = D(pXY‖pXpY).
The variational distance or statistical distance is defined by
V(pX, pY) ,
∫
Rn
|pX(x) − pY(x)| dx.
3With the definitions given above, we are ready to introduce
strong secrecy and semantic security.
Definition 2 (Achievable strong secrecy rate). The message
rate R is an achievable strong secrecy rate if there exists a
sequence of wiretap codes {Cn} of rate R such that
P{Mˆ 6= M} → 0, (reliability)
I(M;Zn)→ 0 (strong secrecy)
when n→∞.
In the definition of strong secrecy for communications, no
special attention is paid to the issue of message distribution.
In fact, a uniform distribution is often assumed in the coding
literature. But this is insufficient from a cryptographic view-
point, as it does not ensure security for a particular message.
To address this issue of the wiretap code, we need to ensure
the mutual information vanishes for all message distributions:
Advmis(Zn) , max
pM
I(M;Zn)→ 0 (3)
when n → ∞. The adversarial advantage Advmis tending
to zero was termed mutual information security in [4]. In
this paper, the terms mutual information security and strong
secrecy for all message distributions are used interchangeably.
Note that one may further impose constraints on the rate
of convergence towards 0; in practice an exponential rate of
convergence is desired.
Let the min-entropy of a discrete random variable M be
H∞(M) = − log
(
max
m
P{M = m}
)
.
Definition 3 (Semantic security). A sequence of wiretap
codes {Cn} achieves semantic security if
Advss(Zn) , sup
f,pM
(
e−H∞(f(M)|Z
n) − e−H∞(f(M))
)
→ 0
when n → ∞. The supremum is taken over all message
distributions pM and all functions f of M taking values in
the set {0, 1}∗ of finite binary words.
Semantic security means that, asymptotically, it is impossi-
ble to estimate any function of the message better than to guess
it without considering Zn at all. We also define distinguishing
security, which means that, asymptotically, the channel outputs
are indistinguishable for different input messages.
Definition 4 (Distinguishing security). A sequence of wiretap
codes {Cn} achieves distinguishing security if
Advds(Zn) , max
m,m′
V(pZn|M=m, pZn|M=m′)→ 0, (4)
when n→∞. The maximum in the previous equation is taken
over all messages m,m′ ∈ Mn.
As for the discrete wiretap channel setup considered in [4],
the classical proof of equivalence between semantic security
and distinguishing security [3] can be readily adapted and it
can be shown that1
2Advss(Zn) ≤ Advds(Zn) ≤ 4Advss(Zn). (5)
1Note that the factors in [4] are 1 on the left and 2 on the right, respectively,
due to the factor 1
2
used in the definition of the variational distance in [4].
Even though the two definitions are equivalent, distinguishing
security often turns out to be technically easier to manipulate.
C. Equivalence
We will show that semantic security and strong secrecy
for all message distributions are equivalent for continuous
channels. This is an extension of the results from Section 3
of [4].
We first need the following continuous channel adaptation of
Csisza´r’s in [2, Lemma 1]. The lower bound is a consequence
of Pinsker’s inequality (see [21, pp.58-59]). The proof of the
upper bound is similar to the discrete case and is given in
Appendix I.
Lemma 1. Let Zn be a random variable defined on Rn
and M be a random variable over a finite domain Mn such
that |Mn| ≥ 4. Then
1
2
d2av ≤ I(M;Zn) ≤ dav log
|Mn|
dav
,
where
dav =
∑
m∈Mn
pM(m)V(pZn|M=m, pZn)
is the average variational distance of the conditional output
distributions from the global output distribution.
We now prove the equivalence between semantic security
and strong secrecy for all message distributions via distin-
guishing security.
Proposition 1. a) A sequence of wiretap codes {Cn} of
rate R which achieves semantic security with advantage
Advds(Zn) = o
(
1
n
)
also achieves strong secrecy for all
message distributions, namely, for all pM,
I(M;Zn) ≤ Advmis(Zn) ≤ εn (nR− log εn) ,
where εn , Advds(Zn). b) A sequence of wiretap codes {Cn}
which achieves strong secrecy for all message distributions
also achieves semantic security:
Advds(Zn) ≤ 2
√
2Advmis(Zn).
Proof:
(a) Distinguishing security ⇒ strong secrecy for all message
distributions: For any m ∈ Mn, we have
V(pZn|M=m, pZn)
=
∫
Rn
∣∣∣pZn|M(z|m)− ∑
m′∈Mn
pM(m
′)pZn|M(z|m′)
∣∣∣dz
=
∫
Rn
∣∣∣ ∑
m′∈Mn
pM(m
′)
(
pZn|M(z|m)− pZn|M(z|m′)
) ∣∣∣dz
≤ max
m′∈Mn
V(pZn|M=m, pZn|M=m′)
≤ max
m′,m′′∈Mn
V(pZn|M=m′ , pZn|M=m′′) = εn.
Therefore dav ≤ εn. By Lemma 1, we obtain
I(M;Zn) ≤ εn log |Mn|
εn
= εnnR− εn log εn.
4If Advds(Zn) = o( 1n ), then I(M;Z
n)→ 0.
(b) Strong secrecy for all message distributions ⇒ dis-
tinguishing security: Let m ∈ Mn be arbitrary. If strong
secrecy holds for all distributions, then in particular it holds
for the distribution pm defined by pm(m′) = 1 if m = m′
and 0 otherwise. Now, Pinsker’s inequality (see [21, pp.58-
59]) asserts that V(p, q) ≤
√
2D(p‖q) for any distributions p
and q. We thus have:
V(p(Zn,m),pZnpm)
=
∑
m′
∫
Rn
∣∣p(Zn,m)(z,m′)− pZn(z)pm(m′)∣∣ dz
=
∫
Rn
∣∣pZn|M=m(z) − pZn(z)∣∣ dz
≤
√
2I(m;Zn).
The strong secrecy assumption implies that:
V(pZn|M=m, pZn) =
∫
Rn
∣∣pZn|M=m(z)− pZn(z)∣∣ dz→ 0.
Using the triangular inequality
V(pZn|M=m, pZn|M=m′)
≤ V(pZn|M=m, pZn) + V(pZn|M=m′ , pZn),
we obtain distinguishing security.
Note that Lemma 2 in [2] also holds: For any distribu-
tion qZn on Rn, we have
dav ≤ 2
∑
m∈Mn
pM(m)V(pZn|M=m, qZn). (6)
Together with Lemma 1, this leads to an upper bound on
the mutual information, in case we can approximate pZn|M=m
by a density that is independent of m.
Lemma 2. Suppose that for all n there exists some density qZn
in Rn such that V(pZn|M=m, qZn) ≤ εn, for all m ∈ Mn.
Then we have dav ≤ 2εn and so
I(M;Zn) ≤ 2εnnR− 2εn log(2εn). (7)
In the rest of this paper, we will use lattice codes to achieve
semantic security over the wiretap channel.
III. LATTICE GAUSSIAN DISTRIBUTION AND FLATNESS
FACTOR
In this section, we introduce the mathematical tools we will
need to describe and analyze our wiretap codes.
A. Preliminaries on Lattices
An n-dimensional lattice Λ in the Euclidean space Rn is a
set defined by
Λ = L (B) = {Bx : x ∈ Zn}
where the columns of the basis matrix B = [b1 · · ·bn] are
linearly independent. The dual lattice Λ∗ of a lattice Λ is
defined as the set of vectors v ∈ Rn such that 〈v,λ〉 ∈ Z, for
all λ ∈ Λ (see, e.g., [22]).
For a vector x, the nearest-neighbor quantizer associated
with Λ is QΛ(x) = argminλ∈Λ ‖λ−x‖. We define the usual
modulo lattice operation by x mod Λ , x − QΛ(x). The
Voronoi cell of Λ, defined by V(Λ) = {x : QΛ(x) = 0},
specifies the nearest-neighbor decoding region. The Voronoi
cell is one example of the fundamental region of a lattice. A
measurable set R(Λ) ⊂ Rn is a fundamental region of the
lattice Λ if ∪λ∈Λ(R(Λ) + λ) = Rn and if (R(Λ) + λ) ∩
(R(Λ) + λ′) has measure 0 for any λ 6= λ′ in Λ. More
generally, for a vector x, the mod R(Λ) operation is defined
by x 7→ xˇ where xˇ is the unique element of R(Λ) such that
xˇ−x ∈ Λ. Obviously, the usual mod-Λ operation corresponds
to the case where R(Λ) = V(Λ).
For a (full-rank) sublattice Λ′ ⊂ Λ, the finite group Λ/Λ′
is defined as the group of distinct cosets λ + Λ′ for λ ∈ Λ.
Denote by [Λ/Λ′] a set of coset representatives. The lattices Λ′
and Λ are often said to form a pair of nested lattices, in which
Λ is referred to as the fine lattice while Λ′ the coarse lattice.
The order of the quotient group Λ/Λ′ is equal to V (Λ′)/V (Λ).
We refer the readers to [12, 23] for more background on
lattice coding, especially the definitions of quantization and
AWGN-good lattices.
B. Lattice Theta Series
The theta series of Λ (see, e.g., [22]) is defined as
ΘΛ(q) =
∑
λ∈Λ
q‖λ‖
2 (8)
where q = ejπz (imaginary part ℑ(z) > 0). Letting z be purely
imaginary, and assuming τ = ℑ(z) > 0, we can alternatively
express the theta series as
ΘΛ(τ) =
∑
λ∈Λ
e−πτ‖λ‖
2
. (9)
For integer p > 0, let Zn → Znp : v 7→ v be the
element-wise reduction modulo-p. Following [24], consider
mod-p lattices (Construction A) of the form ΛC , {v ∈ Zn :
v ∈ C}, where p is a prime and C is a linear code over
Zp. Equivalently, ΛC = pZn +C. In the proof, scaled mod-p
lattices aΛC , {av : v ∈ ΛC} for some a ∈ R+ are used. The
fundamental volume of such a lattice is V (aΛC) = anpn−k,
where n and k are the block length and dimension of the code
C, respectively. A set C of linear codes over Zp is said to be
balanced if every nonzero element of Znp is contained in the
same number of codes from C. In particular, the set of all
linear (n, k) codes over Zp is balanced.
Lemma 3 (Average behavior of theta series). Let C be any
balanced set of linear (n, k) codes over Zp. Then, for 0 <
k < n, for anpn−k = V and τ fixed, we have:
lim
a→0,p→∞
1
|C|
∑
C∈C
ΘaΛC (τ) = 1 +
1
V τn/2
. (10)
The proof of Lemma 3 is provided in Appendix III-A.
5C. Lattice Gaussian Distribution
Lattice Gaussian distributions arise from various problems
in mathematics [25], coding [26] and cryptography [27].
For σ > 0 and c ∈ Rn, we define the Gaussian distribution of
variance σ2 centered at c ∈ Rn as
fσ,c(x) =
1
(
√
2πσ)n
e−
‖x−c‖2
2σ2 ,
for all x ∈ Rn. For convenience, we write fσ(x) = fσ,0(x).
We also consider the Λ-periodic function
fσ,Λ(x) =
∑
λ∈Λ
fσ,λ(x) =
1
(
√
2πσ)n
∑
λ∈Λ
e−
‖x−λ‖2
2σ2 , (11)
for all x ∈ Rn. Observe that fσ,Λ restricted to the quotient
R
n/Λ is a probability density.
We define the discrete Gaussian distribution over Λ centered
at c ∈ Rn as the following discrete distribution taking values
in λ ∈ Λ:
DΛ,σ,c(λ) =
fσ,c(λ)
fσ,Λ(c)
, ∀λ ∈ Λ,
since fσ,Λ(c) =
∑
λ∈Λ fσ,c(λ). Again for convenience, we
write DΛ,σ = DΛ,σ,0.
It will be useful to define the discrete Gaussian distribution
over a coset of Λ, i.e., the shifted lattice Λ− c:
DΛ−c,σ(λ − c) = fσ(λ− c)
fσ,Λ(c)
∀λ ∈ Λ.
Note the relation DΛ−c,σ(λ − c) = DΛ,σ,c(λ), namely, they
are a shifted version of each other.
D. Flatness Factor
The flatness factor of a lattice Λ quantifies the maximum
variation of fσ,Λ(x) for x ∈ Rn.
Definition 5 (Flatness factor). For a lattice Λ and for a
parameter σ, the flatness factor is defined by:
ǫΛ(σ) , max
x∈R(Λ)
|V (Λ)fσ,Λ(x)− 1|
where R(Λ) is a fundamental region of Λ.
It is more illustrative to write
ǫΛ(σ) = max
x∈R(Λ)
∣∣∣∣ fσ,Λ(x)1/V (Λ) − 1
∣∣∣∣ .
Thus, the flatness factor may be interpreted as the maximum
variation of fσ,Λ(x) with respect to the uniform distribution
on R(Λ). In other words, fσ,Λ(x) is within 1 ± ǫΛ(σ) from
the uniform distribution over R(Λ). Note that this definition
slightly differs from that in [28]: The present definition also
takes into account the minimum of fσ,Λ(x).
Proposition 2 (Expression of ǫΛ(σ)). We have:
ǫΛ(σ) =
(
γΛ(σ)
2π
)n
2
ΘΛ
(
1
2πσ2
)
− 1
where γΛ(σ) = V (Λ)
2
n
σ2 is the volume-to-noise ratio (VNR)2.
Proof: Using the Fourier expansion of fσ,Λ(x) over the
dual lattice Λ∗ (see, e.g., [26, 27]), we obtain, for all x ∈
R(Λ):
|V (Λ)fσ,Λ(x) − 1|
=
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
λ∗∈Λ∗
e−2π
2σ2‖λ∗‖2 cos(2π〈λ∗,x〉)− 1
∣∣∣∣∣
(a)
≤
∑
λ∗∈Λ∗
e−2π
2σ2‖λ∗‖2 − 1
(b)
= V (Λ)fσ,Λ(0)− 1
=
V (Λ)
(
√
2πσ)n
∑
λ∈Λ
e−
‖λ‖2
2σ2 − 1
(c)
=
V (Λ)
(
√
2πσ)n
ΘΛ
(
1
2πσ2
)
− 1,
where the equality in (a) holds if x ∈ Λ so that 〈λ∗,x〉 is an
integer for all λ∗ ∈ Λ∗, (b) is due to the Poisson sum formula,
and (c) follows from the definition of the theta series. The
result follows.
From step (a) of the proof, we can see that:
Corollary 1. Alternatively, the flatness factor can be expressed
on the dual lattice Λ∗ as
ǫΛ(σ) = ΘΛ∗
(
2πσ2
)− 1. (12)
Remark 1. The equality in (a) implies that the maxima of both
fσ,Λ(x) and |fσ,Λ(x)− 1/V (Λ)| are reached when x ∈ Λ.
Remark 2. From (12), it is easy to see that ǫΛ is a mono-
tonically decreasing function of σ, i.e., for σ1 < σ2, we have
ǫΛ(σ2) ≤ ǫΛ(σ1).
Remark 3. If Λ2 is a sublattice of Λ1, then ǫΛ1(σ) ≤ ǫΛ2(σ).
Remark 4. The flatness factor is invariant if both Λ and σ
are scaled, i.e., ǫΛ(σ) = ǫaΛ(aσ).
In the following, we show that the flatness factor is equiva-
lent to the notion of smoothing parameter3 that is commonly
used in lattice-based cryptography.
Definition 6 (Smoothing parameter [27]). For a lattice Λ and
for ε > 0, the smoothing parameter ηε(Λ) is the smallest
σ > 0 such that
∑
λ∗∈Λ∗\{0} e
−2π2σ2‖λ∗‖2 ≤ ε.
Proposition 3. If σ = ηε(Λ), then ǫΛ(σ) = ε.
Proof: From Corollary 1, we can see that
ǫΛ(σ) =
∑
λ∗∈Λ∗
e
−2pi2σ2‖λ∗‖2
− 1 =
∑
λ∗∈Λ∗\{0}
e
−2pi2σ2‖λ∗‖2 = ε.
2The definition of VNR varies slightly in literature, by a factor 2π or 2πe.
In particular, the VNR is defined as V (Λ)
2
n /(2πeσ2) in [12, 26], while the
generalized signal-to-noise ratio (GSNR) is defined as V (Λ) 2n /(2πσ2) in
the conference version of this paper [29].
3We remark that this definition differs slightly from the one in [27], where σ
is scaled by a constant factor
√
2π (i.e., s = √2πσ).
6Despite the equivalence, the flatness factor has two main
technical advantages:
• It allows for a direct characterization by the theta series,
which leads to a much better bound due to Lemma 3.
Note that it is ε, not the smoothing parameter, that is of
more interest to communications.
• The studies of the smoothing parameter are mostly con-
cerned with small values of ε, while the flatness factor
can handle both large and small values of ε. This is of
interest in communication applications [28].
Figure 1 illustrates the flatness factor and lattice Gaussian
distribution at different VNRs for lattice Z2. When the VNR
is high (Fig. 1(a)), ǫΛ(σ) is large and the Gaussians are well
separated, implying reliable decoding is possible; this scenario
is desired in communications. When the VNR is low (Fig.
1(b)), ǫΛ(σ) is small and the distribution is nearly uniform,
implying reliable decoding is impossible; this scenario is
desired in security and will be pursued in following sections.
The flatness factor also gives a bound on the variational
distance between the Gaussian distribution reduced mod R(Λ)
and the uniform distribution UR(Λ) on R(Λ). This result was
proven in [27] using the smoothing parameter when R(Λ) is
the fundamental parallelotope. We give a proof for any R(Λ),
for the sake of completeness.
Proposition 4. For c ∈ Rn, let f¯(·) be the density function
of xmodR(Λ) where x ∼ fσ,c(·). Then
V(f¯ , UR(Λ)) ≤ ǫΛ(σ).
Proof: Observe that restricting fσ,Λ to any fundamental
region R(Λ) is equivalent to considering the Gaussian distri-
bution modulo R(Λ):
f¯(x) =
∑
λ∈Λ
fσ,c(x− λ)1R(Λ)(x)
=
∑
λ∈Λ
fσ,λ(x− c)1R(Λ)(x)
= fσ,Λ(x− c)1R(Λ)(x).
Then by definition of ǫΛ(σ), we find∫
R(Λ)
∣∣f¯(t)− UR(Λ)(t)∣∣ dt
≤ V (Λ) max
x∈R(Λ)
∣∣∣∣fσ,Λ(x − c)− 1V (Λ)
∣∣∣∣
= V (Λ) max
x∈R(Λ)−c
∣∣∣∣fσ,Λ(x)− 1V (Λ)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫΛ(σ),
because R(Λ)− c is a fundamental region of Λ.
By definition, the flatness factor in fact guarantees a stronger
property: if ǫΛ(σ) → 0, then fσ,Λ(x) converges uniformly to
the uniform distribution on the fundamental region.
The following result guarantees the existence of sequences
of lattices whose flatness factors can respectively vanish or
explode as n→∞.
Theorem 1. For any σ > 0 and δ > 0, there exists a sequence
of mod-p lattices Λ(n) such that
ǫΛ(n)(σ) ≤ (1 + δ) ·
(
γΛ(n)(σ)
2π
)n
2
, (13)
i.e., the flatness factor goes to zero exponentially for any fixed
VNR (as a function of n) γΛ(n)(σ) < 2π; oppositely, there
also exists a sequence of mod-p lattices Λ′(n) such that
ǫΛ′(n)(σ) ≥ (1− δ) ·
(
γΛ′(n)(σ)
2π
)n
2
, (14)
i.e., its flatness factor goes to infinity exponentially for any
fixed VNR γΛ′(n)(σ) > 2π.
Proof: Lemma 3 guarantees that for all n, δ and τ
there exists a(n, δ, τ) (and the corresponding p such that
anpn−k = V (Λ)) such that EC [ΘaΛC (τ)] ≤ 1+ δ+ 1V (Λ)τ n2 .
Here C is sampled uniformly among all linear (n, k) codes
over Zp and aΛC = {av : v ∈ ΛC}. Therefore there
exists a sequence of lattices Λ(n) such that ΘΛ(n)(τ) ≤
1 + δ + 1
V (Λ(n))τ
n
2
. For this sequence, Proposition 2 gives
ǫΛ(σ) ≤ (1 + δ) (γΛ(σ)/(2π))
n
2 when we let τ = 12πσ2 . The
second half of the theorem can be proved in a similar fashion.
Theorem 1 shows a phenomenon of “phase transition” for
the flatness factor, where the boundary is γΛ(σ) = 2π.
Remark 5. In fact, we can show a concentration result on
the flatness factor of the ensemble of mod-p lattices, that is,
most mod-p lattices have a flatness factor concentrating around
(γΛ(σ)/(2π))
n
2
. In particular, using the Markov inequality, we
see that with probability higher than 1− 2−n over the choice
of Λ(n),
ǫΛ(n)(σ) ≤ (1 + δ) · [2γΛ(n)(σ)/π]
n
2 , (15)
Thus, for γΛ(n)(σ) < π/2, we could have ǫΛ(σ) → 0
exponentially. This is slightly worse than what we have in (12),
but it holds with very high probability, making the construction
of the scheme potentially more practical.
E. Properties of the Flatness Factor
In this section we collect known properties and further
derive new properties of lattice Gaussian distributions that will
be useful in the paper.
From the definition of the flatness factor and Remark 1, one
can derive the following result (see also [27, Lemma 4.4]):
Lemma 4. For all c ∈ Rn and σ > 0, we have:
fσ,c(Λ)
fσ(Λ)
∈
[
1− ǫΛ(σ)
1 + ǫΛ(σ)
, 1
]
.
The following lemma shows that, when the flatness factor
of the coarse lattice is small, a discrete Gaussian distribution
over the fine lattice results in almost uniformly distributed
cosets, and vice versa. The first half of the lemma is a corollary
of Lemma 4 (see [30, Corollary 2.7]), while the second half
is proven in Appendix III-B. Let DΛ,σ,cmodΛ′ be the short
notation for the distribution of LmodΛ′ where L ∼ DΛ,σ,c.
Lemma 5. Let Λ′ ⊂ Λ be a pair of nested lattices such
that ǫΛ′(σ) < 12 . Then
V(DΛ,σ,cmodΛ
′, U(Λ/Λ′)) ≤ 4ǫΛ′(σ),
7(a) γΛ(σ) = 8π, ǫΛ(σ) = 3. (b) γΛ(σ) = π, ǫΛ(σ) = 0.0075.
Fig. 1. Lattice Gaussian distribution and flatness factor for Z2 (a) at high VNR where ǫΛ(σ) is large and the Gaussians are well separated, and (b) at low
VNR where ǫΛ(σ) is small and the distribution is nearly uniform.
where U(Λ/Λ′) denotes the uniform distribution over the finite
set Λ/Λ′. Conversely, if L is uniformly distributed in [Λ/Λ′]
and L′ is sampled from DΛ′,σ,c−L, then the distribution DL+L′
satisfies
V(DL+L′ , DΛ,σ,c) ≤ 2ǫΛ
′(σ)
1− ǫΛ′(σ) .
The next result shows that the variance per dimension of the
discrete Gaussian DΛ,σ,c is not far from σ2 when the flatness
factor is small.
Lemma 6. Let L be sampled from the Gaussian distribution
DΛ,σ,c. If ε , ǫΛ
(
σ/
√
π
π−1/e
)
< 1, then∣∣∣E [‖L− c‖2]− nσ2∣∣∣ ≤ 2πε
1− εσ
2. (16)
Lemma 6 slightly improves upon Lemma 4.3 in [27], which
had another factor n on the right-hand side, and also required
ǫΛ (σ/2) < 1. The details are given in Appendix III-C.
Remark 6. Note that the coefficient
√
π
π−1/e ≈ 1.06. As
shown in Appendix III-C, it is possible to replace the condition
ǫΛ (σ/1.06) < 1 by ǫΛ (σ/c) < 1, where c is arbitrarily close
to 1 (but there is another constant C on the right-hand side of
(16) which grows when c tends to 1).
From the maximum-entropy principle [31, Chap. 11], it
follows that the discrete Gaussian distribution maximizes the
entropy given the average energy and given the same support
over a lattice. The following lemma further shows that if the
flatness factor is small, the entropy of a discrete Gaussian
DΛ,σ,c is almost equal to the differential entropy of a con-
tinuous Gaussian vector of variance σ2 per dimension, minus
logV (Λ), that of a uniform distribution over the fundamental
region of Λ.
Lemma 7 (Entropy of discrete Gaussian). Let L ∼ DΛ,σ,c. If
ε , ǫΛ
(
σ/
√
π
π−1/e
)
< 1, then the entropy of L satisfies∣∣∣H(L)− [n log(√2πeσ)− logV (Λ)]∣∣∣ ≤ ε′,
where ε′ = −log(1− ε) + πε1−ε .
Proof: By using the identity fσ,c(λ) =
1
(
√
2πσ)n
e−
‖λ−c‖2
2σ2 , we obtain:
H(L) = −
∑
λ∈Λ
fσ,c(λ)
fσ,Λ(c)
log
(
fσ,c(λ)
fσ,Λ(c)
)
= log
(
(
√
2πσ)nfσ,c(Λ)
)
+
∑
λ∈Λ
fσ,c(λ)
fσ,Λ(c)
‖λ− c‖2
2σ2
= log
(
(
√
2πσ)nfσ,c(Λ)
)
+
1
2σ2
E
[
‖L− c‖2
]
.
Due to the definition of the flatness factor, we have
fσ,Λ(c) ∈
[
1− ǫΛ(σ)
V (Λ)
,
1 + ǫΛ(σ)
V (Λ)
]
.
Moreover, Lemma 6 implies
1
2σ2
E
[
‖L− c‖2
]
∈
[
n
2
− πε
1− ε ,
n
2
+
πε
1− ε
]
.
Since ǫΛ(σ) < ǫΛ(σ/2) = ε, we have∣∣∣H(L)− [n log(√2πeσ)− logV (Λ)]∣∣∣
< max {log(1 + ε),− log(1− ε)}+ πε
1− ε .
The proof is completed.
The following lemma by Regev (adapted from [32,
Claim 3.9]) shows that if the flatness factor is small, the sum
of a discrete Gaussian and a continuous Gaussian is very close
to a continuous Gaussian.
Lemma 8. Let c ∈ Rn be any vector, and σ0, σ > 0.
Consider the continuous distribution g on Rn obtained by
adding a continuous Gaussian of variance σ2 to a discrete
Gaussian DΛ−c,σ0 :
g(x) =
1
fσ,Λ(c)
∑
t∈Λ−c
fσ0(t)fσ(x− t).
8If ε , ǫΛ
(
σ0σ√
σ20+σ
2
)
< 12 , then
g(x)
f√
σ20+σ
2
(x) is uniformly
close to 1:
∀x ∈ Rn,
∣∣∣∣∣ g(x)f√
σ20+σ
2(x)
− 1
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 4ε. (17)
In particular, the distribution g(x) is close to the continuous
Gaussian density f√
σ20+σ
2 in L1 distance:
V
(
g, f√
σ20+σ
2
)
≤ 4ε.
IV. MOD-Λ GAUSSIAN WIRETAP CHANNEL
Before considering the Gaussian wiretap channel, we will
tackle a simpler model where a modulo lattice operation is
performed at both the legitimate receiver’s and eavesdropper’s
end. That is, both the legitimate channel and the eavesdrop-
per’s channel are mod-Λ channels. The mod-Λ channel is more
tractable and captures the essence of the technique based on
the flatness factor.
A. Channel Model
Let Λs ⊂ Λe ⊂ Λb be a nested chain of n-dimensional
lattices in Rn such that
1
n
log |Λb/Λe| = R, 1
n
log |Λe/Λs| = R′.
We consider the mod-Λs wiretap channel depicted in Figure 2.
The input Xn belongs to the Voronoi region V(Λs) (i.e., Λs is
the shaping lattice), while the outputs Yn and Zn at Bob and
Eve’s end respectively are given by{
Yn = [Xn +Wnb ] modΛs,
Zn = [Xn +Wne ] modΛs,
(18)
where Wnb , Wne are n-dimensional Gaussian vectors with zero
mean and variance σ2b , σ2e respectively.
As in the classical Gaussian channel, the transmitted code-
book C must satisfy the average power constraint (1). We
denote this wiretap channel by W (Λs, σb, σe, P ). Let SNRb =
P/σ2b and SNRe = P/σ2e be the signal-to-noise ratios (SNR)
of Bob and Eve, respectively.
ALICE ENC.
⊕
modΛs DEC. BOB
⊕
modΛs EVE
M,S Xn Y¯n Yn Mˆ
Z¯n Zn
Wn
b
Wne
Fig. 2. The mod-Λs Gaussian wiretap channel.
Remark 7. As was shown in [26], the capacity of a mod-Λ
channel (without MMSE filtering)4 with noise variance σ2 is
achieved by the uniform distribution on V(Λ) and is given by
C(Λ, σ2) =
1
n
(
log(V (Λ))− h(Λ, σ2)) , (19)
where h(Λ, σ2) is the differential entropy of the Λ-aliased
noise W¯n = [Wn] modΛ. Intuitively, the shaping lattice Λs
must have a big flatness factor for Bob, otherwise W¯n will
tend to a uniform distribution such that the capacity is small.
However, to the best of our knowledge, determining the
secrecy capacity of the mod-Λ wiretap channel (18) is still an
open problem. Corollary 2 in [34] provides the lower bound
Cs ≥ C(Λs, σ2b )− C(Λs, σ2e).
B. Nested Lattice Codes for Binning
Consider a message set Mn = {1, . . . , enR}, and a one-
to-one function f : Mn → Λb/Λe which associates each
message m ∈ Mn to a coset λ˜m ∈ Λb/Λe. We make no a
priori assumption on the distribution of m. Also, the set of
coset representatives {λm} are not unique: One could choose
λm ∈ Λb ∩ R(Λe) for any fundamental region R(Λe), not
necessarily the Voronoi region V(Λe).
In order to encode the message m, Alice selects a random
lattice point λ ∈ Λe∩V(Λs) according to the discrete uniform
distribution pL(λ) = 1enR′ and transmits X
n = λ + λm. For
λ˜ ∈ Λe/Λs, define
R(λ˜) =
(
V(Λe) + λ˜
)
modΛs
=
∑
λs∈Λs
(
V(Λe) + λ˜+ λs
)
∩ V(Λs).
The R(λ˜)’s are fundamental regions of Λe and⋃
λ˜∈Λs/Λe
R(λ˜) = V(Λs). (20)
Figure 3 illustrates this relation by an example where Λe = A2
and Λs = 3A2.
To satisfy the power constraint, we choose a shaping lattice
whose second moment per dimension σ2(Λ(n)s ) = P . Under
the continuous approximation for large constellations (which
could further be made precise by applying a dither), the
transmission power will be equal to P .
C. A Sufficient Condition for Strong Secrecy
We now apply the continuous version of Csisza`r’s Lemma
(Lemma 1) to derive an upper bound on the amount of leaked
information on the mod-Λs wiretap channel (18). Note that
even though we consider a mod-Λs channel, the secrecy
condition is given in terms of the flatness factor of the
lattice Λe.
4It is known that if an MMSE filter is added before the mod-Λ operation,
there exists a sequence of lattices approaching the capacity of the AWGN
channel [12, 33]. However, MMSE filtering is not considered in this section.
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Fig. 3. The grey area represents the region R(λ˜) defined in (20) for the
lattice pair Λe = A2, Λs = 3A2, with λ˜ = (3, 0).
Theorem 2. Suppose that the flatness factor of Λe is εn ,
ǫΛe(σe) on the eavesdropper’s channel. Then
I(M;Zn) ≤ 2εnnR− 2εn log(2εn). (21)
Proof: Let Z¯n = Xn+Wne . We have, for any message m:
pZ¯n|M=m(z) =
∑
λ∈Λe∩V(Λs)
pL(λ) · pZ¯n|Xn(z|λ + λm)
=
1
enR′
∑
λ∈Λe∩V(Λs)
fσe,λm+λ(z).
The output distribution of Eve’s channel conditioned on m
having been sent is then given by
pZn|M=m(z) = p(Z¯nmodΛs)|M=m(z)
=
1
enR′
∑
λ∈Λe
1V(Λs)(z) · fσe,λm+λ(z)
=
1
enR′
∑
λ˜∈Λe/Λs
∑
λ∈Λe
1R(λ˜)(z) · fσe,λm+λ(z)
=
1
enR′
∑
λ˜∈Λe/Λs
∑
λ∈Λe
1R(λ˜)(z) · fσe,λm(z− λ)
=
1
enR′
∑
λ˜∈Λe/Λs
f¯
λ˜
(z),
where f¯
λ˜
(z) =
∑
λ∈Λe 1R(λ˜)(z) · fσe,λm(z − λ) is the
density function of a continuous Gaussian with variance σ2e
and center λm reduced modulo the fundamental region R(λ˜).
From Proposition 4, we have that V(f¯
λ˜
, UR(λ˜)) ≤ ǫΛe(σe)
for all λ˜ ∈ Λe/Λs. From the decomposition UV(Λs)(z) =
1
enR′
∑
λ˜∈Λe/Λs UR(λ˜)(z), we obtain
V(pZn|M=m, UV(Λs))
≤ 1
enR′
∑
λ˜∈Λe/Λs
∫
R(λ˜)
∣∣∣f¯
λ˜
(z) − UR(λ˜)(z)
∣∣∣ dz
≤ ǫΛe(σe).
Recalling the definition of dav in Lemma 1, defining
qZ(z) = UV(Λs)(z), and using the inequality (6), we find
that dav ≤ 2ǫΛ(n)e (σe). Then the mutual information can be
estimated using Lemma 2.
From Theorem 2, we obtain a sufficient condition for a
sequence of nested lattice wiretap codes to achieve strong
secrecy.
Corollary 2. For any sequence of lattices Λ(n)e such that
ǫ
Λ
(n)
e
(σe) = o
(
1
n
)
as n→∞, we have I(M;Zn)→ 0.
In fact, Theorem 1 guarantees the existence of mod-p
lattices Λ(n)e whose flatness factor is exponentially small.
Therefore, if Eve’s generalized SNR γΛe(σe) is smaller than 1,
then strong secrecy can be achieved by such lattice codes, and
in that setup the mutual information will vanish exponentially
fast.
Now, we introduce the notion of secrecy-good lattices.
Roughly speaking, a lattice is good for secrecy if its flatness
factor is small. Although ǫ
Λ
(n)
e
(σe) = o
(
1
n
)
is sufficient
to achieve strong secrecy, it is desired in practice that the
information leakage is exponentially small. Thus, we define
secrecy-goodness as follows:
Definition 7 (Secrecy-good lattices). A sequence of lattices
Λ(n) is secrecy-good if
ǫΛ(n)(σ) = e
−Ω(n), ∀γΛ(n)(σ) < 2π. (22)
This definition is slightly more general than (13) of Theorem
1. The purpose is to accommodate the lattices whose theta
series are close to, but not strictly below the Minkowski-
Hlawka bound.
D. Existence of Good Wiretap Codes from Nested Lattices
A priori, the secrecy-goodness property established in the
previous subsection may come at the expense of reliability
for the legitimate receiver. We will show that this is not the
case, i.e., that there exists a sequence of nested lattices which
guarantee both strong secrecy rates and reliability:
Proposition 5. Given R,R′ > 0, there exists a sequence of
nested lattices Λ(n)s ⊂ Λ(n)e ⊂ Λ(n)b whose nesting ratios
satisfy
R′n =
1
n
log
V (Λs)
V (Λe)
→ R′, Rn = 1
n
log
V (Λe)
V (Λb)
→ R
when n→∞, and such that
- Λ
(n)
s is quantization and AWGN-good,
- Λ
(n)
e is secrecy-good,
- Λ
(n)
b is AWGN-good.
The proof of Proposition 5 can be found in Appendix II and
follows the approach of [35]. The main novelty is the addition
of the secrecy-goodness property, which requires checking
that the corresponding condition is compatible with the ones
introduced in [35].
Theorem 3. Let σ2e > e · σ2b . Then as n → ∞, all strong
secrecy rates R satisfying
R <
1
2
log
σ2e
σ2b
− 1
2
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are achievable using nested lattice codes Λ(n)s ⊂ Λ(n)e ⊂ Λ(n)b
on the mod-Λ(n)s wiretap channel W (Λs, σb, σe, P ).
Proof: Consider the binning scheme described in Sec-
tion IV-B, where the nested lattices Λ(n)s ⊂ Λ(n)e ⊂ Λ(n)b
are given by Proposition 5. Since Λ(n)b is AWGN-good,
without MMSE filtering, a channel coding rate (without se-
crecy constraint) R + R′ < 12 log SNRb is achievable at the
legitimate receiver’s end, with the error probability vanishing
exponentially fast in n [12].
Since Λ(n)e is secrecy-good, by Theorem 1 in order to have
strong secrecy at the eavesdropper’s end, it is sufficient for
mod-p lattices to have
γΛe(σe) =
V (Λs)
2
n
(enR′)
2
n σ2e
→ P · 2πe
e2R′σ2e
< 2π,
where V (Λs)
2
n → 2πeσ2(Λ(n)s ) because Λ(n)s is quantization-
good and also P = σ2(Λ(n)s ) under the continuous approxi-
mation. The above relation implies
R′ >
1
2
log SNRe+
1
2
. (23)
Consequently, all strong secrecy rates R satisfying
R <
1
2
log
σ2e
σ2b
− 1
2
are achievable on the wiretap channel W (Λs, σb, σe, P ). Note
that positive rates are achievable by the proposed scheme only
if σ2e > e · σ2b .
For high SNR, the strong secrecy rate that can be achieved
using Proposition 3 is very close to the lower bound on the
secrecy capacity, to within a half nat.
Remark 8. In our strong secrecy scheme, the output distri-
bution of each bin with respect to the eavesdropper’s channel
approaches the output of the uniform distribution in variational
distance. That is, each bin is a resolvability code in the
sense of Han and Verdu´ [36]. In [16, 17] it was shown that
for discrete memoryless channels, resolvability-based random
wiretap codes achieve strong secrecy; we have followed a
similar approach for the Gaussian channel.
In the case when the target output distribution is capacity-
achieving, a necessary condition for the bins to be resolv-
ability codes is that the bin rate should be greater than the
eavesdropper’s channel capacity. Note that this is consistent
with the condition (23): if Λs is good for quantization, the
entropy of the Λs-aliased noise W¯n = [Wn] modΛs tends to
the entropy of a white Gaussian noise with the same variance
[37], and V (Λs) ≈ (2πeP )n2 , so the capacity C(Λs, σ2e) of
the eavesdropper’s channel given by equation (19) tends to
1
2 log 2πeP − 12 log 2πeσ2e = 12 log SNRe.
Remark 9 (Relation to Poltyrev’s setting of infinite constella-
tions). Poltyrev initiated the study of infinite constellations in
the presence of Gaussian noise [23]. In this setting, although
the standard channel capacity is meaningless (so he defined
generalized capacity), the secrecy capacity is finite. This is
because the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wiretap channel
as P →∞ converges to a finite rate 12 log(
σ2e
σ2
b
). Lattice codes
can not be better than this, so it is an upper bound. Even though
we considered a mod-Λs channel in this section, we may
enlarge V(Λs) (i.e., increase R′ while fixing R) to approach
an infinite constellation. Since the upper bound (21) on the
mutual information of our proposed scheme is independent of
V (Λs), the limit exists as V (Λs) → ∞. This corresponds to
the case of infinite constellations. Further, the achieved secrecy
rate is only a half nat away from the upper bound.
V. GAUSSIAN WIRETAP CHANNEL
Although the mod-Λ channel has led to considerable in-
sights, there is no reason in real-world applications why the
eavesdropper would be restricted to use the modulo operation
in the front end of her receiver. In this section, we remove
this restriction and solve the problem of the Gaussian wiretap
channel using lattice Gaussian coding.
A. Channel Model
ALICE ENCODER
⊕
DECODER BOB
⊕
EVE
M,S Xn Yn Mˆ
Zn
Wn
b
Wne
Fig. 4. The Gaussian wiretap channel.
Let Λe ⊂ Λb be n-dimensional lattices in Rn such that
1
n
log |Λb/Λe| = R.
We consider the Gaussian wiretap channel depicted in Fig. 4,
whose outputs Yn and Zn at Bob and Eve’s end respectively
are given by {
Y
n = Xn +Wnb ,
Zn = Xn +Wne ,
(24)
where Wnb , Wne are n-dimensional Gaussian vectors with
zero mean and variance σ2b , σ2e respectively. The transmitted
codebook C must satisfy the average power constraint (1).
We denote this wiretap channel by W (σb, σe, P ). Again, let
SNRb = P/σ
2
b and SNRe = P/σ2e .
B. Lattice Gaussian Coding
Consider a message set Mn = {1, . . . , enR}, and a one-
to-one function φ : Mn → Λb/Λe which associates each
message m ∈ Mn to a coset λ˜m ∈ Λb/Λe. Again, one could
choose the coset representative λm ∈ Λb ∩ R(Λe) for any
fundamental region R(Λe). This is because the signal powers
corresponding to different cosets will be nearly the same, as
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Fig. 5. Lattice Gaussian coding (circle) over 2Z and its coset 2Z+1 for σs =
2. The profile (dashed) is the underlying continuous Gaussian distribution.
R(Λe) (e.g., the fundamental parallelepiped) can result in
low-complexity implementation of the encoder and decoder,
while choosing V(Λe) would require nearest-neighbor search
[38]. Note again that we make no a priori assumption on the
distribution of m.
In order to encode the message m ∈ Mn, Alice samples Xnm
from DΛe+λm,σs (as defined in Section III-C); equivalently,
Alice transmits λ+λm where λ ∼ DΛe,σs,−λm . The choice of
the signal variance σ2s will be discussed later in this Section.
It is worth mentioning that the distribution DΛe+λm,σs is
always centered at 0 for all bins. Fig. 5 illustrates the proposed
lattice Gaussian coding using an example Λe = 2Z for σs = 2.
It is clear that both D2Z,σs and D2Z+1,σs are centered at 0,
sharing the same continuous Gaussian profile. This is key for
the conditional output distributions corresponding to different
m to converge to the same distribution.
Lemma 6 implies that if ǫΛe
(
σs/
√
π
π−1/e
)
< 1/2, then
∣∣∣E [‖Xnm‖2]− nσ2s ∣∣∣ ≤ 2πǫΛe
(
σs/
√
π
π−1/e
)
1− ǫΛe
(
σs/
√
π
π−1/e
)σ2s ,
which is independent of m. Note that the overall input
distribution is a mixture of the densities of Xnm:
pXn(x) =
enR∑
m=1
pM(m)pXnm(x). (25)
Since the second moment in zero of a mixture of densities
is the weighted sum of the second moments in zero of the
individual densities, we have
∣∣∣∣ 1nE [‖Xn‖2]− σ2s
∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2πǫΛe
(
σs/
√
π
π−1/e
)
n
[
1− ǫΛe
(
σs/
√
π
π−1/e
)]σ2s .
(26)
We choose σ2s = P in order to satisfy the average power
constraint (1) asymptotically (as ǫΛe
(
σs/
√
π
π−1/e
)
→ 0).
For convenience, let ρb = σ2s/σ2b and ρe = σ2s/σ2e . It holds
that ρb → SNRb and ρe → SNRe if ǫΛe
(
σs/
√
π
π−1/e
)
→ 0.
C. Achieving Strong Secrecy
We will now show that under suitable hypotheses, the condi-
tional output distributions at Eve’s end converge in variational
distance to the same continuous Gaussian distribution, thereby
achieving strong secrecy.
Recall that Eve’s channel transition probability is given by
pZn|Xn(z|λm + λ) = fσe,λm+λ(z).
Let σ˜e = σsσe√
σ2s+σ
2
e
. Lemma 8 implies that if ǫΛe (σ˜e) < 12 ,
then:
V
(
pZn|M(·|m), f√σ2s+σ2e
)
≤ 4ǫΛe (σ˜e) .
An upper bound on the amount of leaked information then
follows directly from Lemma 2.
Theorem 4. Suppose that the wiretap coding scheme de-
scribed above is employed on the Gaussian wiretap chan-
nel (24), and let εn = ǫΛe (σ˜e). Assume that εn < 12 for
all n. Then the mutual information between the confidential
message and the eavesdropper’s signal is bounded as follows:
I(M;Zn) ≤ 8εnnR− 8εn log 8εn (27)
From Theorem 4, we obtain a sufficient condition for a
sequence of nested lattice wiretap codes to achieve strong
secrecy:
Corollary 3. For any sequence of lattices Λ(n)e such
that ǫ
Λ
(n)
e
(σ˜e) = o
(
1
n
)
as n→∞, we have I(M,Zn)→ 0.
Note that σ˜e is smaller than both σe and σs. The first
inequality σ˜e < σe means that
• Because of the monotonicity of the flatness factor (Re-
mark 2), achieving strong secrecy on the Gaussian wire-
tap channel is a bit more demanding than that on the
mod-Λ channel;
• Yet they are equally demanding at high SNR, since σ˜e →
σe as σs →∞.
The second inequality σ˜e < σs requires that ǫΛe(
√
P )
be small, which means that a minimum power P is needed
(specifically,
√
P should be larger than the smoothing param-
eter of Λe).
Remark 10. Note that, similarly to the mod-Λ case (Re-
mark 8) each bin of our strong secrecy scheme may be viewed
as a resolvability code, and thus the bin rate must necessarily
be above Eve’s channel capacity. Indeed, the bin rate can be
chosen to be quite close to this optimal value: note that for
εn in Theorem 4 to vanish, it suffices that
γΛe (σ˜e) =
V (Λe)
2/n
σ˜2e
< 2π (28)
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for the mod-p lattices of the first part of Theorem 1. By
Lemma 7, when ε , ǫΛe
(
σs/
√
π
π−1/e
)
< 1, the entropy
rate of each bin satisfies
R′ ≥ log(
√
2πeσs)− 1
n
logV (Λe)− ε
′
n
> log(
√
2πeσs)− 1
2
log
(
2π
σ2sσ
2
e
σ2s + σ
2
e
)
− ε
′
n
=
1
2
log
(
σ2s + σ
2
e
σ2e
)
+
1
2
− ε
′
n
=
1
2
log (1 + ρe) +
1
2
− ε
′
n
.
where ε′ is defined in Lemma 7. Since P → σ2s as ε → 0
(by (26)), we have ρe → SNRe. Also, ε′ → 0 as ε → 0.
To make ε → 0, we only need an extra sufficient condition
γΛe
(
σ0/
√
π
π−1/e
)
< 2π for the mod-p lattices of Theo-
rem 1.
D. Achieving Reliability
Now we show Bob can reliably decode the confidential mes-
sage by using MMSE lattice decoding. Consider the decoding
scheme for Bob where he first decodes to the fine lattice Λb,
then applies the mod-Λe operation to recover the confidential
message. We note that the distribution of Alice’s signal can
be approximated by DΛb,σs , when the confidential message
is uniformly distributed. More precisely, since Alice transmits
x ∼ DΛe+λm,σs , by Lemma 5, the density pXn of x is close to
the discrete Gaussian distribution over Λb, if λm ∈ Λb/Λe is
uniformly distributed. In fact, we have V(pXn , DΛb,σs) ≤ 2ε1−ε
when ε , ǫΛe(σs) < 12 .
We will derive the maximum-a-posteriori (MAP) decod-
ing rule for decoding to Λb, assuming a discrete Gaussian
distribution DΛb,σs over Λb. Since the lattice points are not
equally probable a priori in the lattice Gaussian coding, MAP
decoding is not the same as standard maximum-likelihood
(ML) decoding.
Proposition 6 (Equivalence between MAP decoding and
MMSE lattice decoding). Let x ∼ DΛb,σs be the input signal-
ing of an AWGN channel where the noise variance is σ2b . Then
MAP decoding is equivalent to Euclidean lattice decoding
of Λb using a renormalized metric that is asymptotically close
to the MMSE metric.
Proof: Bob receives y = x+wb. Thus the MAP decoding
metric is given by
P(x|y) = P(x,y)
P(y)
∝ P(y|x)P(x)
∝ exp
(
−‖y − x‖
2
2σ2b
− ‖x‖
2
2σ2s
)
∝ exp
(
−1
2
(
σ2s + σ
2
b
σ2sσ
2
b
∥∥∥∥ σ2sσ2s + σ2b y − x
∥∥∥∥2
))
.
Therefore,
arg max
x∈Λb
P(x|y) = arg min
x∈Λb
∥∥∥∥ σ2sσ2s + σ2b y − x
∥∥∥∥2
= arg min
x∈Λb
‖αy − x‖2 (29)
where α = σ
2
s
σ2s+σ
2
b
is known, thanks to (26), to be asymptoti-
cally close to the MMSE coefficient P
P+σ2
b
.
Next we prove Bob’s reliability for any secrecy rate close
to the secrecy capacity. We use the α-renormalized decoding
metric (29), even if the confidential message is not necessarily
uniformly distributed. In fact, the following proofs hold for any
fixed message index m. Also note that no dither is required to
achieve reliability. Indeed, as we will see, Regev’s regularity
lemma (Lemma 8) makes the dither unnecessary. This is
because the equivalent noise will be asymptotically Gaussian.
Suppose Alice transmits message m, and Bob receives y =
x + wb = λ + λm + wb (with λ ∼ DΛe,σs,−λm ). From
Proposition 6, Bob computes
λˆm = [QΛb (αy)]modR(Λe).
It is worth mentioning that since QΛb (αy) ∈ Λb, the
modR(Λe) operation is the remapping to cosets in Λb/Λe,
which can be implemented easily [38].
Recall the following properties of the mod and quantization
operations. For all a,b ∈ Rn, we have
[[a] modR(Λe) + b] modR(Λe) = [a+ b] modR(Λe)
(30)
[QΛb(a)]modR(Λe) = [QΛb ([a] modR(Λe))]modR(Λe).
(31)
Using these properties, the output of Bob’s decoder can be
rewritten as
λˆm = [QΛb (x+ (α− 1)x+ αwb)]modR(Λe)
= [QΛb ([x+ (α− 1)x+ αwb] modR(Λe))]modR(Λe).
Observe that since λ ∈ Λe, we have
[x+ (α− 1)x+ αwb] modR(Λe)
= [λm + (α− 1)x+ αwb] modR(Λe)
= [λm + w˜b(m)]modR(Λe)
where we have defined the equivalent noise
w˜b(m) = (α− 1)x+ αwb.
Therefore
λˆm = [QΛb (λm + w˜b(m))]modR(Λe).
Let p
W˜n
b
(m) be the density of the equivalent noise w˜b(m).
Since x ∼ DΛe+λm,σs and wb is Gaussian, Lemma 8 implies
that for any fixed m, and randomizing over λ, p
W˜n
b
(m) is very
close to a continuous Gaussian distribution. More precisely,
applying Lemma 8 with standard deviations (α − 1)σs and
ασb, and defining σ˜b =
√
(α− 1)2σ2s + α2σ2b = σsσb√σ2s+σ2b ,
we have∣∣∣pW˜n
b
(m)(w)− fσ˜b(w)
∣∣∣ ≤ 4ε′′fσ˜b(w) ∀w ∈ Rn, (32)
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assuming that (recall ρb = σ2s/σ2b )
ε′′ , ǫ(1−α)Λe
(
(1− α)σs√
1 + 1/ρb
)
= ǫΛe
(
σs√
1 + 1/ρb
)
<
1
2
.
Thus, if ε′′ → 0, the equivalent noise is essentially statistically
independent from m, in the sense that it is very close to the
distribution fσ˜b(w) that does not involve m at all.
Theorem 5. Suppose SNRb > e and 1+SNRb1+SNRe > e. Then if Λ
(n)
b
is a sequence of AWGN-good lattices, and Λ(n)e is a sequence
of secrecy-good lattices, any strong secrecy rate R satisfying
R <
1
2
log
(
min
{
1 + SNRb
1 + SNRe
, SNRb
})
− 1
2
(33)
is achievable on the Gaussian wiretap channel W (σb, σe, P )
using the discrete Gaussian coding and MMSE-renormalized
Euclidean lattice decoding.
Proof: The decoding error probability Pe(m) correspond-
ing to the message m is bounded from above as
Pe(m) ≤ P {QΛb (λm + w˜b(m)) 6= λm}
= P {w˜b(m) /∈ V(Λb)} .
Since in particular
p
W˜n
b
(m)(w) < (1 + 4ε
′′)fσ˜b(w) ∀w ∈ Rn,
we find that
P {w˜b(m) /∈ V(Λb)} ≤ (1 + 4ε′′) · P {wˆb /∈ V(Λb)}
where wˆb is i.i.d. Gaussian with variance σ˜2b . Note that while
the equivalent noise w˜b(m) in general depends on m, the
resulting bound on the error probability is independent of m.
From AWGN-goodness of Λb [12], it follows that the
decoding error probability Pe tends to 0 exponentially fast
if ε′′ is bounded by a constant and if
γΛb (σ˜b) =
V (Λb)
2/n
σ˜2b
> 2πe. (34)
On the other hand, since Λe is secrecy-good, Theorem 4
implies that a sufficient condition for the mod-p lattices of
Theorem 1 to achieve strong secrecy is
γΛe (σ˜e) =
V (Λe)
2/n
σ˜2e
< 2π. (35)
Combining (34) and (35), we have that strong secrecy
rates R satisfying
R =
1
n
log
V (Λe)
V (Λb)
<
1
2
log
(
1 + ρb
1 + ρe
)
− 1
2
(36)
are achievable.
Two extra conditions on the flatness factors are required.
First, to make ρb → SNRb and ρe → SNRe, it suffices that
ǫΛe
(
σs/
√
π
π−1/e
)
→ 0 (by (26)). This condition can be
satisfied by mod-p lattices if
γΛe
 σs√
π
π−1/e
 = V (Λe)2/n
σ2s
π
π−1
< 2π,
Algorithm 1 Klein Sampling Algorithm
Input: A basis B = [b1, . . .bn] of Λ, σs, c
Output: λ ∈ Λ of distribution close to DΛ,σs,c
1: λ = 0
2: for i = n, . . . , 1 do
3: σi = σs/‖bˆi‖, c′i = 〈c, bˆi〉/‖bˆi‖2
4: Sample zi from DZ,σi,c′i
5: c = c− zibi, λ = λ+ zibi
6: return λ
which together with (34) limits the secrecy rate to
R <
1
2
log
(
1 + ρb
π
π−1/e
)
− 1
2
. (37)
The second condition ǫΛe
(
σs√
1+1/ρb
)
→ 0 for the equivalent
noise to be asymptotically Gaussian (by (32)) can be satisfied
by mod-p lattices if
γΛe
(
σs√
1 + 1/ρb
)
=
V (Λe)
2/n
σ2s
1+1/ρb
< 2π,
which together with (34) limits the secrecy rate to
R <
1
2
log ρb − 1
2
. (38)
Now, combining (36)-(38) and considering a positive se-
crecy rate, we obtain (33) when SNRb > e and 1+SNRb1+SNRe > e.
Note that condition (37) has been absorbed in (33). Therefore,
the theorem is proven.
Remark 11. When SNRb · SNRe > 1, the first term of (33) is
smaller. This leads to
R <
1
2
log(1 + SNRb)− 1
2
log(1 + SNRe)− 1
2
(39)
which is within a half nat from the secrecy capacity.
Remark 12. It can be checked that, in our framework, conven-
tional (non-renormalized) minimum-distance lattice decoding
can only achieve strong secrecy rate up to
R <
1
2
log (SNRb)− 1
2
log (1 + SNRe)− 1
2
.
This is because it requires
γΛb(σb) =
V (Λb)
2/n
σ2b
> 2πe
rather than (34). Therefore, MAP decoding or MMSE estima-
tion allows to gain a constant 1 within the logarithm of the
first term.
Remark 13. The existence of good wiretap codes for the
Gaussian channel follows from Proposition 5. In fact, this case
is less demanding than the mod-Λs channel there since no
shaping lattice is needed. We only need a sequence of nested
lattices Λ(n)e ⊂ Λ(n)b where Λ(n)e is secrecy-good (with respect
to σ˜e rather than σe) and Λ(n)b is AWGN-good.
To encode, Alice needs an efficient algorithm to sample
lattice points from the distribution DΛe+λm,σs over the coset
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Λe+λm. Without loss of generality, we discuss sampling from
DΛ−c,σs = DΛ,σs,c−c for some center c. Fortunately, such an
efficient algorithm exists when σs is sufficiently large. More
precisely, it was proven in [30] that Klein’s algorithm [39]
samples from a distribution very close to DΛ,σs,c when σs
is a bit larger than the norm of the possessed basis of Λe.
Klein’s sampling algorithm is equivalent to a randomized
version of successive interference cancelation (SIC), and
can be implemented in polynomial complexity. Algorithm 1
shows the pseudo-code of Klein sampling, where bˆi (i =
1, . . . , n) are the Gram-Schmidt vectors of matrix B. Note that
Klein’s algorithm has also been used in lattice decoding [40],
to improve the performance of SIC. The following result,
adapted from [30], ensures that the output distribution is close
to DΛ,σs,c.
Lemma 9. Given a basis B of an n-dimensional lattice Λ
and its Gram-Schmidt vectors bˆi (i = 1, . . . , n). Let ηε(Z)
be the smoothing parameter of Z for ε ≤ 12 . If σs ≥ ηε(Z) ·
maxi ‖bˆi‖, then for any c, the output of Klein’s algorithm has
distribution D′ satisfying∣∣∣∣D′Λ,σs,c(λ)DΛ,σs,c(λ) − 1
∣∣∣∣ ≤ (1 + 4ε)n − 1, ∀λ ∈ Λ. (40)
It follows from [30, Lemma 3.1] that ηε(Z) ≤ ω(
√
logn)
for some negligible ε. Thus, the condition σs ≥ ω(
√
logn) ·
maxi ‖bˆi‖ is sufficient to ensure that the distance (40) van-
ishes. One restriction of Lemma 9 is that in order to not require
a too large σs, we need to possess a short basis for Λe. Such
a short basis may be found by lattice reduction, e.g., the LLL
reduction [40].
Obviously, the L1 distance or statistical distance is also
bounded as (40). The statistical distance is a convenient tool
to analyze randomized algorithms. An important property
is that applying a deterministic or random function to two
distributions does not increase the statistical distance. This
implies an algorithm behaves similarly if fed two nearby distri-
butions. More precisely, if the output satisfies a property with
probability p when the algorithm uses a distribution D, then
the property is still satisfied with probability ≥ p−V(D,D′)
if fed D′ instead of D (see [41, Chap. 8]).
VI. DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have studied semantic security over the
Gaussian wiretap channel using lattice codes. The flatness
factor serves as a new lattice parameter to measure information
leakage in this setting. It can tell whether a particular lattice is
good or not for secrecy coding, and consequently provides a
design criterion of wiretap lattice codes. Since the message in
encoded by the cosets (not the particular coset leaders), map-
ping and demapping of the message can be implemented with
low complexity. Consequently, Bob’s decoding complexity is
essentially due to that of decoding the AWGN-good lattice.
While we have proved the existence of secrecy-good mod-
p lattices, the explicit construction of practical secrecy-good
lattices warrants an investigation. Further work along the line
of secrecy gain [8] may provide some hints on secrecy-good
lattices.
The half-nat gap to the secrecy capacity is intriguing. It
would be interesting to find out what happens in between,
and to further explore the relation between various lattice
parameters.
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APPENDIX I
PROOF OF CSISZA´R’S LEMMA FOR CONTINUOUS
CHANNELS
Proof: Note that in spite of the ambiguous notation, here
pZ and pZ|M=m are densities on Rn, while pM and pM|Z=z are
probability mass functions on Mn. We have
dav =
∑
m∈Mn
pM(m)
∫
Rn
∣∣pZ|M=m(z)− pZ(z)∣∣ dz
=
∑
m∈Mn
∫
Rn
∣∣pM|Z=z(m)pZ(z) − pM(m)pZ(z)∣∣ dz
=
∫
Rn
∑
m∈Mn
∣∣pM|Z=z(m)− pM(m)∣∣ pZ(z)dz
=
∫
Rn
V(pM, pM|Z=z)dµ
=
∫
Rn
VM(z)dµ,
where VM(z) = V(pM, pM|Z=z) and dµ = pZ(z)dz is the
probability measure associated to Z.
By using Lemma 2.7 in [21], we obtain
H(M)−H(M|Z = z) ≤ VM(z) log |Mn|
VM(z)
.
Multiplying by pZ(z) and taking the integral, we find
I(M;Z) = H(M)−H(M|Z)
≤
∫
Rn
VM(z) log
|Mn|
VM(z)
dµ
=
∫
Rn
VM(z) log |Mn|dµ−
∫
Rn
VM(z) logVM(z)dµ.
From Jensen’s inequality, using the fact that the function t 7→
t log t is convex, we have that∫
Rn
VM(z) logVM(z)dµ
≥
(∫
Rn
VM(z)dµ
)
log
(∫
Rn
VM(z)dµ
)
= dav log dav.
This completes the proof.
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APPENDIX II
EXISTENCE OF GOOD NESTED LATTICES:
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
Let C denote the set of Fp-linear (n, k) codes, and let C
be chosen uniformly at random from C. Consider the corre-
sponding Construction-A random lattice
Λ˜s =
1
p
C + Zn.
By definition of the effective radius, we have:
pk =
Γ
(
n
2 + 1
)
π
n
2 reff(Λ˜s)n
.
We know from [35, Theorem 5] that with high probability,
the lattice Λ˜s is Covering, quantization and AWGN-good if
the following properties are satisfied:
(i) ∃β < 12 : k ≤ βn,
(ii) lim
n→∞
k
log2 n
=∞,
(iii) ∀n : rmin < reff(Λ˜s) < 2rmin, where
rmin = min
14 , (reff(Λ˜s))232nσ2bEP ( reff (Λ˜s)√nσb )
 .
In the previous formula, EP denotes the Poltyrev exponent
EP (µ) =

1
2 [(µ− 1)− logµ] 1 < µ ≤ 2
1
2 log
eµ
4 2 ≤ µ ≤ 4
µ
8 µ ≥ 4
(41)
where µ = γΛs (σb)2πe . Property (iii) implies that the fundamental
volume is bounded by
π
n
2 (rmin)
n
Γ
(
n
2 + 1
) < V (Λ˜s) = 1
pk
<
π
n
2 (2rmin)
n
Γ
(
n
2 + 1
) , (42)
which tends to 0 faster than exponentially, since Euler’s
Gamma function grows faster than any exponential. Given
(n, k) with k satisfying (i) and (ii), consider p˜(n, k) prime
satisfying the condition (42). (The existence of such a prime
number has been proven in [35].)
As explained in [35] (end of Section III), in order to
use Λ˜s for power-constrained shaping it is necessary to scale
it differently: we consider Λs = apΛ˜s = BsZn scaled so that
its second moment satisfies σ2(Λs) = P .
Since Λs is quantization-good, its normalized second mo-
ment satisfies G(Λs) = σ
2(Λs)
V (Λs)
2
n
= P
V (Λs)
2
n
→ 12πe as n→∞
[12]. Therefore
V (Λs)
2
n =
P
G(Λs)
→ 2πPe.
For large n, we have
V (Λs) = a
npn−k ≈ (2πeP )n2 . (43)
Since pk grows superexponentially, so does pn−k and we
thus have a → 0 and ap → ∞ as n → ∞. If we
set a in such a way that V (Λs) is constant for a → 0
and p→∞ (but may depend on n), then for each n we have
a Minkowski-Hlawka type bound on the average behaviour
of the theta series ΘΛs(τ) (see Lemma 3). Fix δn > 0. For
all n, there exists p¯(n, k, δn, τ) such that for every prime
p > p¯(n, k, δn, τ) and the corresponding a,
E [ΘΛs(τ)] ≤ 1 + δn +
1
V (Λs)τ
n
2
. (44)
The following lemma, proven in Appendix III, gives a more
precise bound on the rate of convergence of the theta series to
the Minkowski-Hlawka bound and guarantees that this choice
of p is compatible with (42).
Lemma 10. There exists a sequence δn → 0 such that for
sufficiently large n, we have p˜(n, k) > p¯(n, k, δn, y).
Having defined the shaping lattice, we proceed with a nested
code construction inspired by Section VII in [12]. Let Cb be
chosen uniformly in the ensemble Cb of random linear (n, kb)
codes over Fq , and denote by Ab its generator matrix. We
know from [42] that if nq → 0, then the lattice
Λb = Bs
(
1
q
Cb + Z
n
)
.
is AWGN-good with high probability. Let ke < kb, and let Ae
be the matrix whose columns are the first ke columns of Ab.
This matrix generates an (n, ke) linear code Ce over Fq;
note that averaging over the possible choices for Cb, this
construction results in Ce being a uniformly chosen (n, ke, q)
linear code. We can consider the corresponding Construction-
A lattice
Λe = Bs
(
1
q
Ce + Z
n
)
.
Clearly, we have Λs ⊆ Λe ⊆ Λb. As remarked in [42], there
are many choices for q and ke, kb which ensure the properties
R′n =
1
n
log
V (Λs)
V (Λe)
=
ke
n
log q → R′,
Rn =
1
n
log
V (Λe)
V (Λb)
=
kb
n
log q → R.
(45)
For example we can choose q to be the closest prime to n logn
and define ke =
⌊
nR′(log q)−1
⌋
, kb =
⌊
n(R+R′)(log q)−1
⌋
.
Consider the expectation over over the sets C and Ce
of (n, k, p) and (n, ke, q) linear codes. By Proposition 2, we
have:
lim
n→∞
EC,Ce [ǫΛe(σ)]
= lim
n→∞
(
γΛe(σ)
2π
)n
2
EC
[
ECe
[
ΘΛe
(
1
2πσ2
)]]
− 1. (46)
Let f(x) = e−πτ‖x‖
2
, v¯ = vmod q, and C∗e = Ce \ {0}. We
have
ECe [ΘΛe(τ)]
=
1
|Ce|
∑
Ce∈Ce
∑
v∈Zn
v¯=0
f
(
Bsv
q
)
+
∑
v∈Zn
v¯∈C∗e
f
(
Bsv
q
)
=
∑
v∈qZn
f
(
Bsv
q
)
+
qke − 1
qn − 1
∑
v∈Zn:v¯ 6=0
f
(
Bsv
q
)
16
=
∑
v∈Zn
f (Bsv) +
qke − 1
qn − 1
∑
v∈Zn\qZn
f (Bsv/q)
=
(
1− q
ke − 1
qn − 1
)
ΘΛs(τ) +
qke − 1
qn − 1 ΘΛs
(
τ
q2
)
.
In the last equation we have used the equality ΘaΛ(τ) =
ΘΛ(a
2τ).
We can now rewrite (46) as
lim
n→∞
(
γΛe(σ)
2π
)n
2
(
EC
[
ΘΛs(τ) +
1
qn−ke
ΘΛs
(
τ
q2
)])
− 1
where τ = 12πσ2 . Using the property (44), this can be boundedby
lim
n→∞
(
γΛe(σ)
2π
)n
2
(
1 +
(2πσ2)
n
2
V (Λs)
+ δn
)
+ lim
n→∞
(
γΛe(σ)
2π
)n
2
(
1
qn−ke
(
1 +
(2πσ2q2)
n
2
V (Λs)
+ δn
))
− 1
≤ lim
n→∞
(
γΛe(σ)
2π
)n
2

1 + 1
enR
′
(
γΛe (σ)
2pi
)n
2
+ δn +
1(
γΛe (σ)
2pi
)n
2


= lim
n→∞
(
γΛe(σ)
2π
)n
2
(1 + δn)
recalling that enR′n = qke (see (45)). Therefore Λe is secrecy-
good.
Further, we can show the majority of such lattices are
secrecy-good. Fix 0 < c ≤ 12 and let δ =
(
γΛe
(σ)
2π
)n
2 (1+δn)
c .
Then using Markov’s inequality we get
P {ǫΛe(σ) ≥ δ} ≤
E [ǫΛe(σ)]
δ
≤ c
Therefore if γΛe(σ) < 2π, the sequence Λe(n) is secrecy-good
with probability greater than 1− c ≥ 12 .
To conclude, for n large enough there exists a set of measure
going to 1 in the ensemble C×Cb such that Λs is quantization
and AWGN-good and Λb is AWGN-good [12], and a set of
measure greater than 1/2 in the same ensemble such that Λe is
secrecy-good. The intersection of these sets being non-empty,
the existence of a good sequence of nested lattices follows as
stated.
APPENDIX III
PROOFS OF TECHNICAL LEMMAS
A. Proof of Lemma 3
Let f(v) = e−πτ‖v‖
2 for v ∈ Rn and fixed τ ∈ R+,
and denote by C′ the set of all nonzero codewords of C.
Following [24], we have
1
|C|
∑
C∈C
∑
v∈aΛC
f(v)
=
1
|C|
∑
C∈C
[ ∑
v∈Zn:v=0
f(av) +
∑
v∈Zn:v∈C′
f(av)
]
=
∑
v∈Zn:v=0
f(av) +
pk − 1
pn − 1
∑
v∈Zn:v 6=0
f(av) (47)
=
∑
v∈apZn
f(v) +
pk − 1
pn − 1
 ∑
v∈aZn
f(v)−
∑
v∈apZn
f(v)

(48)
where (47) is due to the balance of C. We have∑
v∈apZn
f(v) = ΘapZn(τ) → 1 (49)
for any τ > 0, since ap → ∞ under the conditions given.
Moreover,
pk − 1
pn − 1
∑
v∈aZn
f(v)→ V −1
∫
Rn
f(v)dv (50)
as a→ 0, p→∞ and anpn−k = V is fixed. To see this, con-
sider any sequence aℓ → 0 and define fℓ(v) = f
(
aℓ
⌊
v
aℓ
⌉)
,
then use Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem, the
functions fℓ being dominated by g(v) which is equal to 1
if v ∈ [− 12 , 12]n and equal to e−πτ∑ni=1(|vi|− 12 )2 otherwise.
Thus, we have
1
|C|
∑
C∈C
∑
v∈aΛC
f(v)→ 1 + V −1
∫
Rn
f(v)dv. (51)
Since
∫
Rn
f(v)dv = τ−n/2, we obtain (10).
Remark 14. Although we are primarily concerned with the
theta series, the average behavior (51) is more general and
may be of independent interest. In fact, (51) holds as long as
the function f(·) satisfies conditions (49) and (50).
B. Proof of the second part of Lemma 5
Let ε = ǫΛ′(σ). From Lemma 4, we have that ∀λ˜ ∈ [Λ/Λ′],
fσ,λ˜+c(Λ
′)
fσ(Λ′)
∈
[
1− ε
1 + ε
, 1
]
.
Therefore, for all λ˜ ∈ [Λ/Λ′]:
|Λ/Λ′| · fσ,λ˜+c(Λ′)
S
∈
[
1− ε
1 + ε
,
1 + ε
1− ε
]
,
where S =
∑
λ˜∈[Λ/Λ′] fσ,λ˜+c(Λ
′) ∈
[
1−ε
1+ε , 1
]
|Λ/Λ′|fσ(Λ′).
As a consequence, for all λ′ ∈ Λ′:
|DΛ,σ,c(λ˜+ λ′)− pL+L′(λ˜+ λ′)|
= fσ,c(λ˜ + λ
′)
∣∣∣∣∣ 1S − 1|Λ/Λ′| fσ,λ˜+c(Λ′)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ fσ,c(λ˜ + λ
′)
S
max
(∣∣∣∣1− 1 + ε1− ε
∣∣∣∣ , ∣∣∣∣1− 1− ε1 + ε
∣∣∣∣)
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=
2ε
1− εDΛ,σ,c(λ˜+ λ
′).
C. Proof of Lemma 6
Let x ∼ DΛ,σ,c. For convenience, we consider the case s :=√
2πσ = 1. The general case follows by scaling the lattice by
a factor s. From [27, p.14], each component xi satisfies∣∣∣∣E[(xi − ci)2]− 12π
∣∣∣∣ ≤
∑
y∈Λ∗ y
2
i · ρ(y)
1− ρ(Λ∗ \ 0) (52)
where ρ(y) = e−π‖y‖2 . A bound y2i ≤ ‖y‖2 ≤ e‖y‖
2
was
subsequently applied for each i in [27]. Here, we tighten this
bound as follows. Firstly, we note that the following overall
bound holds (by linearity)∣∣∣E[‖x− c‖2]− n
2π
∣∣∣ ≤ ∑y∈Λ∗ ‖y‖2 · ρ(y)
1− ρ(Λ∗ \ 0) , (53)
hence avoiding the multiple n on the right-hand side. Secondly,
since y ≤ ey/e, the numerator in (53) can be bounded as∑
y∈Λ∗
‖y‖2 · ρ(y) ≤
∑
y∈Λ∗\0
e‖y‖
2/e · e−π‖y‖2
=
∑
y∈Λ∗\0
e−(π−1/e)‖y‖
2
= ǫΛ
(
σ/
√
π
π − 1/e
)
rather than ǫΛ (σ/2). Then Lemma 6 follows.
It is possible to further reduce
√
π
π−1/e . Introduce a param-
eter 0 < t ≤ 1/e, and let Y be the larger solution of the two
solutions to equation y = ety . Then the numerator in (53) can
be bounded by∑
y∈Λ∗,‖y‖≤Y
‖y‖2 · e−π‖y‖2 +
∑
y∈Λ∗,‖y‖>Y
et‖y‖
2 · e−π‖y‖2
≤ Y 2
∑
y∈Λ∗,‖y‖≤Y
e−π‖y‖
2
+
∑
y∈Λ∗,‖y‖>Y
e−(π−t)‖y‖
2
≤ Y 2ǫΛ (σ) + ǫΛ
(
σ/
√
π
π − t
)
≤ (t−4 + 1) ǫΛ(σ/√ π
π − t
)
where the last step is because t = log(Y )/Y ≤ 1/
√
Y . Thus,
for a small but fixed value of t, the coefficient
√
π
π−t can be
very close to 1, at the cost of a large constant t−4 + 1.
D. Proof of Lemma 10
We study more explicitly the rate of convergence, by going
back to the expression (48) in the proof of Lemma 3. We can
rewrite it as(
1− p
k − 1
pn − 1
)(
ΘZn(a
2p2τ)
)
+
pk − 1
pn − 1
(
ΘZn(a
2τ)
)
=
(
1− p
k − 1
pn − 1
)(
ΘZ(a
2p2τ)
)n
+
pk − 1
pn − 1
(
ΘZ(a
2τ)
)n
From the bound∫
R
e−τz
2
dz = 2
∫ ∞
0
e−τz
2
dz
≤ ΘZ(τ) = 1 + 2
∑
z≥1
e−yz
2
≤ 1 + 2
∫ ∞
0
e−τz
2
dz = 1 +
∫
R
e−τz
2
dz,
and recalling that anpn−k = V , we find that
1
pn−k
(
ΘZ(a
2τ)
)n ≤ an
V
(
1 +
1
a
∫
R
e−τz
2
dz
)n
=
1
V
∫
Rn
e−τ‖v‖
2
dv +O
(
n
V 1−
1
n p1−
k
n
)
,
while the lower bound is simply
1
pn−k
(
ΘZ(a
2τ)
)n ≥ 1
V
∫
Rn
e−τ‖v‖
2
dv.
Similarly, we have
1 ≤ (ΘZ(a2p2τ))n ≤ 1 + 1
V
1
n p
k
n
n
∫
R
e−τz
2
dz + o
(
n
1
n
p
k
n
)
.
It is not hard to see that the sequence p˜(n, k) defined by (42)
ensures (more than exponentially fast) convergence.
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